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Abstract
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated
negotiation among self-interested agents, and other
multiagent applications. A coalition of agents can
sometimes accomplish things that the individual
agents cannot, or can do things more efficiently.
However, motivating the agents to abide to a so-
lution requires careful analysis: only some of the
solutions are stable in the sense that no group of
agents is motivated to break off and form a new
coalition. This constraint has been studied ex-
tensively in cooperative game theory. However,
the computational questions around this constraint
have received less attention. When it comes to
coalition formation among software agents (that
represent real-world parties), these questions be-
come increasingly explicit.
In this paper we define a concise general represen-
tation for games in characteristic form that relies
on superadditivity, and show that it allows for ef-
ficient checking of whether a given outcome is in
the core. We then show that determining whether
the core is nonempty is NP-complete both with
and without transferable utility. We demonstrate
that what makes the problem hard in both cases is
determining the collaborative possibilities (the set
of outcomes possible for the grand coalition), by
showing that if these are given, the problem be-
comes tractable in both cases. However, we then
demonstrate that for a hybrid version of the prob-
lem, where utility transfer is possible only within
the grand coalition, the problem remains NP-
complete even when the collaborative possibilities
are given.
1 Introduction
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotia-
tion among self-interested agents. A coalition of agents can
∗The material in this paper is based upon work supported by the
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sometimes accomplish things that the individual agents can-
not, or can do things more efficiently. However, motivat-
ing the agents to abide to a solution requires careful analy-
sis: only some of the solutions are stable in the sense that
no group of agents is motivated to break off and form a new
coalition. This constraint has been studied extensively in co-
operative game theory. However, the computational questions
around this constraint have received less attention. When
it comes to coalition formation among software agents (that
represent real-world parties), these questions become increas-
ingly explicit.
In general, computational complexity could stem from
each potential coalition having some hard optimization prob-
lem. For example, when the agents are carrier companies
with their own trucks and delivery tasks, they can save costs
by forming a coalition (pooling their trucks and tasks), but
each potential coalition faces a hard optimization problem:
a vehicle routing problem defined by the coalition’s trucks
and tasks. The effect of such hard optimization problems
on coalition formation has been studied by Sandholm and
Lesser [Sandholm and Lesser, 1997]. As in the bulk of re-
search on coalition formation, in this paper we do not address
that issue. Rather, we assume that such optimization prob-
lems have already been solved (at least the pertinent ones),
and given this, we characterize the stable feasible outcomes.
This has been the focus of most of the work in coalition for-
mation. The contribution of this paper belongs to the rela-
tively new, small set of papers that study the complexity of
characterizing such solutions.
The determination of stable solutions has electronic com-
merce applications beyond automated negotiation as well.
For example, consider a large number of companies, some
subsets of which could form profitable virtual organizations
that can respond to larger or more diverse orders than the in-
dividual companies can. Determining stable value divisions
allows one to see which potential virtual organizations would
be viable in the sense that the companies in the virtual orga-
nization would naturally stay together. As another example,
consider a future online service that determines how much
each employee of a company should be paid so that the com-
pany does not collapse as a result of employees being bought
away by other companies. The input to this service would
be how much subsets of the company’s employees would be
paid if they left collectively (for instance, a whole department
could be bought away). This input could come from salary
databases or a manager’s estimate. The computational prob-
lem of determining a stable renumeration would be crucial
for such a service. Both of these example problems fit ex-
actly under the model that we study in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we review the required concepts from cooperative game the-
ory. In Section 3, we define a concise general representation
for games in characteristic form that relies on superadditiv-
ity, and show that it allows for efficient checking of whether
a given outcome is in the core. In Section 4, we show that
determining whether the core is nonempty is NP-complete
both with and without transferable utility. In Section 5, we
demonstrate that what makes the problem hard in both cases
is determining the collaborative possibilities (the set of out-
comes possible for the grand coalition), by showing that if
these are given, the problem becomes tractable in both cases.
In Section 6, we show that for a hybrid version of the prob-
lem, where utility transfer is possible only within the grand
coalition, the problem remains NP-complete even when the
collaborative possibilities are given.
2 Definitions from cooperative game theory
In this section we review standard definitions from coopera-
tive game theory, which we will use throughout the paper. In
the definitions, we follow the most prevalent advanced text-
book in microeconomics [Mas-Colell et al., 1995].
In general, how well agents in a coalition do may
depend on what nonmembers of the coalition do
(e.g. [Bernheim et al., 1987; Chatterjee et al., 1993;
Evans, 1997; Milgrom and Roberts, 1996;
Moreno and Wooders, 1996; Okada, 1996; Ray, 1996]).
However, in cooperative game theory, coalition
formation is usually studied in the context of
characteristic function games where the utilities
of the coalition members do not depend on the
nonmembers’ actions [Kahan and Rapoport, 1984;
van der Linden and Verbeek, 1985;
Zlotkin and Rosenschein, 1994;
Charnes and Kortanek, 1966; Shapley, 1967; Wu, 1977].
(One way to interpret this is to consider the coalition mem-
bers’ utilities to be the utilities they can guarantee them-
selves no matter what the nonmembers do [Aumann, 1959;
Tohme´ and Sandholm, 1999].)
Definition 1 Given a set of players A, a utility possibil-
ity vector uB for B = {b1, . . . , bnB} ⊆ A is a vector
(ub1 , . . . , ubnB ) representing utilities that the players in B
can guarantee themselves by cooperating with each other. A
utility possibility set is a set of utility possibility vectors for a
given set B.
Definition 2 A game in characteristic form consists of a set of
players A and a utility possibility set V (B) for each B ⊆ A.
Sometimes games in characteristic form have transferable
utility, which means agents in a coalition can transfer utility
among themselves.
Definition 3 A game in characteristic form is said to have
transferable utility if for every B ⊆ A there is a number v(B)
(the value of B) such that
V (B) = {uB = (uBb1 , . . . , u
B
bnB
) :
∑
b∈B
uBb ≤ v(B)}.
It is commonly assumed that the joining of two coalitions
does not prevent them from acting as well as they could have
acted separately. In other words, the composite coalition can
coordinate by choosing not to coordinate. This assumption
is known as superadditivity.1 We will assume superadditiv-
ity throughout the paper. This actually makes our hardness
results stronger because even a restricted version of the prob-
lem is hard.
Definition 4 A game in characteristic form is said to be su-
peradditive if, for any B,C ⊆ A with B and C disjoint, and
for any uB ∈ V (B) and uC ∈ V (C), we have (uB, uC) ∈
V (B ∪ C). (In the case of transferable utility, this is equiva-
lent to saying that for any B,C ⊆ A with B and C disjoint,
v(B ∪ C) ≥ v(B) + v(C).)
We now need a solution concept. In this paper, we study
only the best known solution concept, which is called the
core [Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Kahan and Rapoport, 1984;
van der Linden and Verbeek, 1985]. It was first introduced by
Gillies [Gillies, 1953].
Definition 5 An outcome uA = (uA
1
, . . . , uAn ) ∈ V (A) is
blocked by coalition B ⊆ A if there exists
uB = (uBb1 , . . . , u
B
bnB
) ∈ V (B) such that for all b ∈ B,
uBb > u
A
b . (In the case of transferable utility, this is equiv-
alent to saying that the outcome is blocked by B if v(B) >∑
b∈B
uAb .) An outcome is in the core if it is blocked by no coali-
tion.
In general, the core can be empty. If the core is empty, the
game is inherently unstable because no matter what outcome
is chosen, some subset of agents is motivated to pull out and
form their own coalition. In other words, requiring that no
subset of agents is motivated to break off into a coalition of
its own overconstrains the system.
An example of a game with an empty core is the one with
players {x, y, z}, where we have the utility possibility vectors
u{x,y} = (2, 1), u{y,z} = (2, 1), and u{x,z} = (1, 2) (and the
ones that can be derived from this through superadditivity).
The same example with transferable utility also has an empty
core.
In the rest of this paper, we will study the question of how
complex it is to determine whether the core is nonempty, that
is, whether there is a solution or the problem is overcon-
strained.
3 Representing characteristic form games
concisely
In our representation of games in characteristic form, we dis-
tinguish between games without transferable utility, where
1When superadditivity holds, it is always best for the grand
coalition of all agents to form. On the other hand, without super-
additivity, even finding the optimal coalition structure (partition
of agents into coalitions) can be hard [Sandholm et al., 1999;
Larson and Sandholm, 2000; Shehory and Kraus, 1998;
Shehory and Kraus, 1996; Ketchpel, 1994].
we specify some utility possibility vectors for some coali-
tions, and games with transferable utility, where we specify
the values of some coalitions.
If the representation of the game specifies V (B) or v(B)
explicitly for each coalition B ⊆ A, then the length of the
representation is exponential in the number of agents. In that
case, any algorithm for evaluating nonemptiness of the core
(as long as it reads all the input) requires time exponential in
the number of agents. However, that run time is polynomial in
the size of the input (this can be accomplished, for example,
using the algorithms that we introduce in Section 5).
Of course, most characteristic form games that represent
real-world settings have some special structure. This usually
allows for a game representation that is significantly more
concise. The complexity of characterizing the core has al-
ready been studied in certain very specific concisely express-
ible families of games before. For example, Faigle et al. study
the complexity of testing membership in the core in minimum
cost spanning tree games [Faigle et al., 1994]. Deng and Pa-
padimitriou study games where the players are nodes of a
graph with weights on the edges, and the value of a coali-
tion is determined by the total weight of the edges contained
in it [Deng and Papadimitriou, 1994]. Deng et al. study an in-
teger programming formulation which captures many games
on graphs [Deng et al., 1997]. All of those results depend
heavily on concise game representations which are specific
to the game families under study. Typically, such a family
of games is played on a combinatorial structure. Cooperative
games on combinatorial structures have been systematically
studied [Bilbao, 2000].
As a point of deviation, we study a natural representation
that can capture any characteristic form game.2 Conciseness
in our representation stems only from the fact that in many
settings, the synergies among coalitions are sparse. When
a coalition introduces no new synergy, its utility possibility
vectors can be derived using superadditivity. Therefore, the
input needs to include only the utility possibility vectors of
coalitions that introduce synergy. The following definitions
make this precise.
Definition 6 We represent a game in characteristic form
without transferable utility by a set of players A, and a
set of utility possibility vectors W = {(B, uB,k)}. (Here
there may be multiple vectors for the same B, distinguished
by different k indices.) The utility possibility set for a
given B ⊆ A is then given by V (B) = {uB : uB =
(uB1 , . . . , uBr),
⋃
1≤i≤r Bi = B, all the Bi are disjoint, and
for all the Bi, (Bi, uBi) ∈ W}. To avoid senseless cases that
have no outcomes, we also require that ({a}, (0)) ∈ W for
all a ∈ A.3
Definition 7 We represent a game in characteristic form with
transferable utility by a set of players A, and a set of values
W = {(B, v(B))}. The value for a given B ⊆ A is then
2Our hardness results are not implied by the earlier hardness re-
sults for specific game families because it is not possible to concisely
represent those games in our input language.
3Setting the utility to 0 in this case is without loss of generality,
as we can simply normalize the utility function to obtain this.
given by v(B) = max{
∑
1≤i≤r
v(Bi) :
⋃
1≤i≤r Bi = B, all
the Bi are disjoint, and for all the Bi, (Bi, v(Bi)) ∈W}. To
avoid senseless cases that have no outcomes, we also require
that ({a}, 0) ∈ W whenever {a} does not receive a value
elsewhere in W .
So, we only need to specify a basis of utility possibilities,
from which we can then derive the others. This representa-
tion integrates rather nicely with real-world problems where
determining any coalition’s value is complex. For example, in
the multiagent vehicle routing problem, we solve the routing
problem for every coalition that might introduce new syner-
gies. When it is clear that there is no synergy between two
coalitions (for example, if they operate in different cities and
each one only has deliveries within its city), there is no need
to solve the routing problem of the coalition that would result
if the two coalitions were to merge.
The following lemmas indicate that we can also use this
representation effectively for checking whether an outcome
is in the core, that is, whether it satisfies the strategic con-
straints.
Lemma 1 Without transferable utility, an outcome uA =
(uA
1
, . . . , uAn ) ∈ V (A) is blocked by some coalition if and
only if it is blocked by some coalition B through some utility
vector uB , where (B, uB) ∈ W .
Proof: The ”if” part is trivial. For “only if”, suppose uA is
blocked by coalition C through some uC , so that for every
c ∈ C, uCc > u
A
c . We know uC = (uC1 , . . . , uCr) where
(Ci, u
Ci) ∈ W . But then, C1 blocks uA through uC1 .
The proof for the same lemma in the case of transferable
utility is only slightly more intricate.
Lemma 2 With transferable utility, an outcome uA =
(uA
1
, . . . , uAn ) ∈ V (A) is blocked by some coalition if and
only if it is blocked by some coalition B through its value
v(B), where (B, v(B)) ∈W .
Proof: The ”if” part is trivial. For ”only if”, suppose uA is
blocked by coalitionC through v(C), so that v(C) >
∑
c∈C
uAc .
We know that v(C) =
∑
1≤i≤r
v(Ci) where(Ci, v(Ci)) ∈ W .
It follows that
∑
1≤i≤r
v(Ci) >
∑
1≤i≤r
∑
c∈Ci
uAc , and hence for at
least one Ci, we have v(Ci) >
∑
c∈Ci
uAc . But then Ci blocks
uA through v(Ci).
4 Checking whether the core is nonempty is
hard
We now show that with this representation, it is hard to check
whether the core is nonempty. This holds both for the non-
transferable utility setting and for the transferable utility set-
ting.
Definition 8 (CORE-NONEMPTY) We are given a super-
additive game in characteristic form (with or without trans-
ferable utility) in our representation language. We are asked
whether the core is nonempty.
We will demonstrate NP-hardness of this problem by re-
ducing from theNP-complete EXACT-COVER-BY-3-SETS
problem [Garey and Johnson, 1979].
Definition 9 (EXACT-COVER-BY-3-SETS) We are given
a set S of size 3m and a collection of subsets {Si}1≤i≤r of S,
each of size 3. We are asked if there is a cover of S consisting
of m of the subsets.
We are now ready to state our results.
Theorem 1 CORE-NONEMPTY without transferable utility
is NP-complete.
Proof: To show that the problem is in NP , nondeterministi-
cally choose a subset of W , and check if the corresponding
coalitions constitute a partition of A. If so, check if the out-
come corresponding to this partition is blocked by any ele-
ment of W .
To show NP-hardness, we reduce an arbitrary EXACT-
COVER-BY-3-SETS instance to the following
CORE-NONEMPTY instance. Let the set of players be
A = S ∪ {w, x, y, z}. For each Si, let (Si, uSi) be an el-
ement of W , with uSi = (2, 2, 2). Also, for each s ∈ S,
let ({s, w}, u{s,w}) be an element of W , with u{s,w} =
(1, 4). Also, let ({w, x, y, z}, u{w,x,y,z}) be an element of
W , with u{w,x,y,z} = (3, 3, 3, 3). Finally, let ({x, y}, u{x,y})
with u{x,y} = (2, 1), ({y, z}, u{y,z}) with u{y,z} = (2, 1),
({x, z}, u{x,z}) with u{x,z} = (1, 2) be elements of W . The
only other elements of W are the required ones giving util-
ity 0 to singleton coalitions. We claim the two instances are
equivalent.
First suppose there is an exact cover by 3-sets consisting
of Sc1 , . . . , Scm . Then the following outcome is possible:
(uSc1 , . . . , uScm , u{w,x,y,z}) = (2, 2, . . . , 2, 3, 3, 3, 3). It is
easy to verify that this outcome is not blocked by any coali-
tion. So the core is nonempty.
Now suppose there is no exact cover by 3-sets. Suppose
the core is nonempty, that is, it contains some outcome uA =
(uC1 , . . . , uCr) with each (Ci, uCi) an element of W , and
the Ci disjoint. Then one of the Ci must be {s, w} for some
s ∈ S: for if this were not the case, there must be some s ∈ S
with uAs = 0, because the Ci that are equal to Si cannot cover
S; but then {s, w} would block the outcome. Thus, none
of the Ci can be equal to {w, x, y, z}. Then one of the Ci
must be one of {x, y}, {y, z}, {x, z}, or else two of {x, y, z}
would block the outcome. By symmetry, we can without loss
of generality assume it is {x, y}. But then {y, z} will block
the outcome. (Contradiction.) So the core is empty.
We might hope that the convexity introduced by transfer-
able utility makes the problem tractable through, for example,
linear programming. This turns out not to be the case.
Theorem 2 CORE-NONEMPTY with transferable utility is
NP-complete.
Proof: To show that the problem is in NP , nondeterministi-
cally choose a subset of W , and check if the corresponding
coalitions constitute a partition of A. If so, nondeterministi-
cally divide the sum of the coalitions’ values over the players,
and check if this outcome is blocked by any element of W .
To show NP-hardness, we reduce an arbitrary EXACT-
COVER-BY-3-SETS instance to the following
CORE-NONEMPTY instance. Let the set of players be
A = S ∪ {x, y}. For each Si, let (Si, 3) be an element of
W . Additionally, let (S ∪ {x}, 6m), (S ∪ {y}, 6m), and
({x, y}, 6m) be elements of W . The only other elements of
W are the required ones giving value 0 to singleton coalitions.
We claim the two instances are equivalent.
First suppose there is an exact cover by 3-sets consist-
ing of Sc1 , . . . , Scm . Then the value of coalition S is at
least
∑
1≤i≤m
v(Sci) = 3m. Combining this with the coali-
tion {x, y}, which has value 6m, we conclude that the grand
coalition A has value at least 9m. Hence, the outcome
(1, 1, . . . , 1, 3m, 3m) is possible. It is easy to verify that
this outcome is not blocked by any coalition. So the core
is nonempty.
Now suppose there is no exact cover by 3-sets. Then the
coalition S has value less than 3m (since there are no m dis-
joint Si), and as a result the value of the grand coalition is less
than 9m. It follows that in any outcome, the total utility of at
least one of S ∪ {x}, S ∪ {y}, and {x, y} is less than 6m. So
this coalition will block. So the core is empty.
Our results imply that it is computationally hard to make
any strategic assessment of a game in characteristic form
when it is concisely represented.
5 Specifying redundant information about the
grand coalition makes the problem
tractable
Our proofs that CORE-NONEMPTY is hard relied on con-
structing instances where it is difficult to determine what the
grand coalition can accomplish. So, in effect, the hardness
derived from the fact that even collaborative optimization is
hard in these instances. While this is indeed a real difficulty
that occurs in the analysis of characteristic form games, we
may nevertheless wonder to what extent computational com-
plexity issues are introduced by the purely strategic aspect of
the games. To analyze this, we investigate the computational
complexity of CORE-NONEMPTY when V (A) (or v(A))
is explicitly provided as (possibly redundant) input, so that
determining what the grand coalition can accomplish can no
longer be the source of any complexity.4 It indeed turns out
that the problem becomes easy both with and without trans-
ferable utility.
Theorem 3 When V (A) is explicitly provided, CORE-
NONEMPTY without transferable utility is in P .
Proof: The following simple algorithm accomplishes this ef-
ficiently. For each element of V (A), check whether it is
blocked by any element of W .
4Bilbao et al. have studied the complexity of the core in charac-
teristic form games with transferable utility when there is an oracle
that can provide the value v(B) of any coalition B [Bilbao et al., ].
Our amended input corresponds to asking one such query in addition
to obtaining the unamended input.
For the transferable utility case, we make use of linear pro-
gramming.
Theorem 4 When v(A) is explicitly provided, CORE-
NONEMPTY with transferable utility is in P .
Proof: We decide how to allocate the v(A) among the agents
by solving a linear program. The core is nonempty if and only
if the following linear program has a solution:
•
∑
1≤i≤n
ui ≤ v(A);
• For any (B, v(B)) in W ,
∑
b∈B
ub ≥ v(B).
The algorithms in the proofs also construct a solution that
is in the core, if the core is nonempty.
6 Hybrid games remain hard
Not all complexity issues disappear through having the col-
laborative optimization problem solution available. It turns
out that if we allow for hybrid games, where only some coali-
tions can transfer utility among themselves, the hardness re-
turns. In particular, we show hardness in the case where only
the grand coalition can transfer utility. This is a natural model
for example in settings where there is a market institution that
enforces payments, but if a subset of the agents breaks off, the
institution collapses so payments cannot be enforced.
We demonstrate NP-hardness of this problem by re-
ducing from the NP-complete NODE-COVER prob-
lem [Garey and Johnson, 1979].
Definition 10 (NODE-COVER) We are given a graph G =
(V,E), and a number k. We are asked whether there is a
subset of V of size k such that each edge has at least one of
its endpoints in the subset.
We are now ready to state our result.
Theorem 5 When only the grand coalition can transfer util-
ity,
CORE-NONEMPTY is NP-complete, even when v(A) is ex-
plicitly provided as input.
Proof: To show that the problem is in NP , nondeterministi-
cally divide v(A) over the players, and check if this outcome
is blocked by any element of W .
To show NP-hardness, we reduce an arbitrary NODE-
COVER instance to the following CORE-NONEMPTY in-
stance. Let A = V ∪ {x, y, z}, and let v(A) = 6|V | + k.
Furthermore, for each edge (vi, vj), let ({vi, vj}, u{vi,vj}) be
an element of W , with u{vi,vj} = (1, 1). Finally, for any
a, b ∈ {x, y, z} (a 6= b), let ({a, b}, u{a,b}) be an element
of W , with u{a,b} = (3|V |, 2|V |). The only other elements
of W are the required ones giving utility 0 to singleton coali-
tions. This game does not violate the superadditivity assump-
tion, since without the explicit specification of v(A), super-
additivity can at most imply that v(A) = 6|V | ≤ 6|V | + k.
We claim the two instances are equivalent.
First suppose there is a node cover of size k. Consider the
following outcome: all the vertices in the node cover receive
utility 1, all the other vertices receive utility 0, and each of
x, y, and z receives utility 2|V |. Using the fact that all the
edges are covered, it is easy to verify that this outcome is not
blocked by any coalition. So the core is nonempty.
Now suppose there is some outcome uA in the core. In
such an outcome, either each of {x, y, z} receives at least
2|V |, or two of them receive at least 3|V | each. (For if
not, there is some a ∈ {x, y, z} with uAa < 2|V | and some
b ∈ {x, y, z} (b 6= a) with uAb < 3|V |, and the coalition
{b, a} will block through u{b,a} = (3|V |, 2|V |).) It follows
that the combined utility of all the elements of V is at most k.
Now, for each edge (vi, vj), at least one of its vertices must
receive utility at least 1, or this edge would block. So the ver-
tices that receive at least 1 cover the edges. But because the
combined utility of all the elements of V is at most k, there
can be at most k such vertices. So there is a node cover.
Hybrid games, where only some coalitions can transfer
utility, are quite likely to appear in real-world multiagent
settings, for example because only some of the agents use
a currency. Our result shows that for such hybrid games,
even when the collaborative optimization problem has al-
ready been solved, it can be computationally hard to strate-
gically assess the game.
7 Conclusions and future research
Coalition formation is a key problem in automated negotia-
tion among self-interested agents, and other multiagent ap-
plications. A coalition of agents can sometimes accomplish
things that the individual agents cannot, or can do things more
efficiently. However, motivating the agents to abide to a so-
lution requires careful analysis: only some of the solutions
are stable in the sense that no group of agents is motivated
to break off and form a new coalition. This constraint has
been studied extensively in cooperative game theory. How-
ever, the computational questions around this constraint have
received less attention. When it comes to coalition forma-
tion among software agents (that represent real-world par-
ties), these questions become increasingly explicit.
In this paper we defined a concise general representation
for games in characteristic form that relies on superadditivity,
and showed that it allows for efficient checking of whether
a given outcome is in the core. We then showed that deter-
mining whether the core is nonempty is NP-complete both
with and without transferable utility. We demonstrated that
what makes the problem hard in both cases is determining
the collaborative possibilities (the set of outcomes possible
for the grand coalition), by showing that if these are given, the
problem becomes tractable in both cases. However, we then
demonstrated that for a hybrid version of the problem, where
utility transfer is possible only within the grand coalition, the
problem remains NP-complete even when the collaborative
possibilities are given.
Future research can take a number of different directions.
One such direction is to investigate the complexity of re-
stricted families of games in characteristic form.5 Another
5One interesting restricted family is that of convex games. In a
convex game (with transferable utility), for any B,C ⊆ A, v(B) +
v(C) ≤ v(B ∪ C) + v(B ∩ C), and in such games the core is
known to always be nonempty. How complex it is here to construct
direction is to evaluate other solution concepts in cooperative
game theory from the perspective of computational complex-
ity under our input representation. A long-term goal is to
extend our framework for finding a strategically stable solu-
tion to take into account issues of computational complexity
in determining the synergies among coalitions (for example,
when routing problems need to be solved, potentially only
approximately, in order to determine the synergies).
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